Exploring the effect of the spatial scale of fishery management by Takashina, Nao & Baskett, Marissa L.
 1 
Exploring the effect of the spatial scale of fishery management 
 
Nao Takashina1,* and Marissa L. Baskett2 
 
 1. Department of Biology, Faculty of Sciences, 
   Kyushu University, 6-10-1, Hakozaki, Fukuoka, 8128581, Japan 
  nao.takashina@gmail.com 
2. Department of Environmental Science and Policy, 
  University of California, Davis, One Shields Ave, Davis, CA 95616 
  mlbaskett@ucdavis.edu 
 
Abstract 
For any spatially explicit management, determining the appropriate spatial scale of 
management decisions is critical to success at achieving a given management goal. 
Specifically, managers must decide how much to subdivide a given managed region: from 
implementing a uniform approach across the region to considering a unique approach in 
each of one hundred patches and everything in between. Spatially explicit approaches, such 
as the implementation of marine spatial planning and marine reserves, are increasingly used 
in fishery management. Using a spatially explicit bioeconomic model, we quantify how the 
management scale affects optimal fishery profit, biomass, fishery effort, and the fraction of 
habitat in marine reserves. We find that, if habitats are randomly distributed, the fishery 
profit increases almost linearly with the number of segments. However, if habitats are 
positively autocorrelated, then the fishery profit increases with diminishing returns. 
Therefore, the true optimum in management scale given cost to subdivision depends on the 
habitat distribution pattern. 
 
Keywords: bioeconomic model, management scale, and marine reserves 
 
Introduction 
The importance of spatial scale has been well recognized in many fields of 
ecology (Levin 1992), such as species-area relationships, maps of species richness, and 
conservation planning (Palmer and White 1994, Schwartz 1999, Margules and Pressey 
2000, Turner and Tjørve 2005, Hurlbert and Jetz 2007). Spatially explicit approaches to 
ecosystem management introduce a management scale overlaid on the natural spatial scale 
of ecological processes. Specifically, managers must decide how much to subdivide the 
area under concern: from implementing a uniform approach across the region to 
considering a unique approach in each of hundreds of patches and everything in between. 
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This scale of management assessment and implementation affects the ability to achieve 
management goals. For example, analysis of range-map data at inappropriately fine 
resolutions might lead to the identification of erroneous “biodiversity hotspots” with overly 
optimistic estimates of species representation in reserves and potentially invalid 
complementarity sets for identifying conservation priorities (Hurlbert and Jetz 2007).  
Ecosystem-based fisheries management (EBFM) is an inherently spatially 
explicit approach to fisheries management, including the implementation of marine 
reserves, or no-take zones (Pikitch et al. 2004). Marine reserves’ goals range from 
conserving species to support sustainable fisheries management (Leslie 2005, Lester et al. 
2009). Even without reserves, EBFM typically involves a spatially explicit approach to 
harvest decision in terms of zonal allocations of fishing effort (Francis et al. 2007), which 
can increase fishery profit over spatially uniform management if appropriately based on 
habitat distribution and connectivity (Rassweiler et al. 2012). However, few studies 
explicitly considered the effect of the choice of spatial scale in spatial fishery management 
on achieving management goals.  
 Under spatial fisheries management, managers must choose a management scale to 
define a management unit (i.e., zoning unit), and fishing regulations such as entry limitation 
and establishment of reserves occur within these zoning units (Cancino et al. 2007, White 
and Costello 2011). For example, the concept of setting variable harvest rates over space 
was implemented for co-occurring fisheries of less productive and productive species in the 
US west coast, such as yellowtail and canary rockfish (Francis 1986) and yelloweye 
rockfish and lingcod (Dougherty et al. 2013). Spatial management through a fine filter 
enables managers to allocate fishing efforts and reserves more flexibly compared to 
management through a coarse filter, but a finer filter imposes greater complexity on the 
decision-making process and enforcement. For territorial user rights fisheries (TURFs), 
coarser management scales increase achievement of optimal harvest due to the greater 
degree of ownership and lower competition (White and Costello 2011). However, for 
fisheries under top-down control such as the case where federal-level government decisions 
determine individual fishing effort, the appropriate management scale might change 
because competition between management units does not occur. 
To investigate how the choice of spatial management scale affects fishery and 
ecological outcomes such as optimal fishery profit, biomass, fishery effort, and the fraction 
of habitat in marine reserves, we construct a spatially explicit bioeconomic model that 
follows an age-structured harvested population. Using two California species, cabezon 
(Scorpaenichthys marmorata) and red abalone (Haliotis rufescens), we compare two spatial 
management strategies: allocating reserve or non-reserve patches with a uniform fishing 
rate versus allocating fishing rate in each patch, where allocation within the management 
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scale maximizes fishery profit. We then investigate the relationship between the spatial 
scale of management and the above-mentioned fishery and ecological outcomes under 
varying degrees of autocorrelation in the habitat, which determines the spatial scale of 
habitat. 
 
Methods 
We aim to construct the simplest possible model that allows us to quantify the relationship 
between the choice of spatial management scale and our metrics for fishery and ecological 
outcomes. As detailed below, the managed population occurs in a naturally patchy habitat, 
where the choice of management scale relative to the natural habitat patch size determines 
its effect on population dynamics. We explore different values of spatial autocorrelation in 
habitat patches to model different levels of natural patchiness. Larval dispersal connects the 
patches, where populations then experience density-dependent recruitment. Post-settlement 
individuals remain within habitat patches (i.e., a relatively sedentary species) according to 
an age-structured model with density-independent natural and harvest mortality; the 
structured population dynamics allow us to determine the effect of management decisions 
on population biomass and biomass yield. To model top-down control given a particular 
management scale, the fishery optimizes profit across the entire habitat based on 
management-patch-specific effort allocation, with two approaches. First, management 
patches have either zero effort (reserves) or harvest, with the same effort in all harvested 
patches and both this effort level and which patches are harvested are chosen to maximize 
yield (uniform effort, or UE, strategy); this approach models the optimal use of reserves in 
fishery management, with no further spatially-explicit management beyond reserve 
designation. Second, the amount of effort in each management patch (including the 
possibility of zero effort) is chosen to maximize yield (fine-tuned effort, or FE, strategy); 
this approach models a fully spatially explicit management approach. We then determine 
the effect of management scale on effort and profit as our fishery outcomes as well as 
population biomass and fraction of the habitat in marine reserves as our ecological 
outcomes.  
 
Environmental and management scale 
The target species population occurs along a coastline where we approximate the 
geographic landscape by a one-dimensional patchy environment with different patterns of 
autocorrelation in habitat quality. The minimum size of habitat defines the environmental 
scale that determines the population dynamics. Whether or not fishing occurs in a given 
location depends on a separate management scale (Fig. 1). We define the management scale 
as the size of a minimum management unit where fishing effort is uniform within the 
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region. We assume that the minimum management scale is the environmental scale. The 
environmental scale inherently depends on ecological and physiological characteristics of a 
species and geomorphological patterns (Levin 1992). The management scale depends on 
managers or fishermen based on, for example, assessment data or range maps (Hopkinson 
et al. 2000, Hurlbert and Jetz 2007), and it characterizes the spatial fishery management. 
Here we set the environmental scale (minimum habitat patch size) to 1km to match the 
minimum environmental scale of the target species in their post-larval home range (i.e. 
<1km adult movement). The management scale can then be 20,  21,  !, or 2n  times larger 
than the environmental scale where n is the number of subdivisions. Hereafter, we use 
“habitat patch”, or, briefly, “patch” to indicate the environmental scale, and we explicitly 
refer to “management patch” when discussing a management location. 
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic description of the model. (a) The degree of autocorrelation determines 
the environmental scale. (b) Population dynamics occur at the environmental scale. 
Planktonic larval dispersal connects individual patches. Larvae successfully arriving at a 
patch experience density-dependent recruitment and subsequently follow age-structured 
dynamics. (c) Managers chose a management scale for a given region. (d) Managers 
allocate fishing efforts and reserves to each management patch so as to maximize fishery 
profit for each given management scale. 
  
Habitat landscape 
We construct an n-patch habitat landscape relative carrying capacity z1,!, zn( )  
with the auto-regressive model (AR(1) model) to generate various autocorrelations patterns 
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between patches in a manner analogous to how they are often measured in field data (Dale 
and Fortin 2009). Increasing positive autocorrelation indicates increasing similarity 
between neighboring patches and therefore increasing habitat scale. With the degree of 
autocorrelation φ1  and white noise εi  with 0 mean and a variance of 1, we employ the 
AR(1) model 
zi = φ1zi−1 +εi .      (1) 
We regard the i-th patch to be habitat if zi > 0  and non-habitat if zi ≤ 0 . Specifically we 
define zi  as zi =max φ1zi−1 +εi,  0( ) , and any individuals that disperse to non-habitat do 
not survive. 
 
Population dynamics 
In the bioeconomic model underlying our analysis, post-settlement age classes 
experience natural mortality at a rate M and, after growing to the age at legal size aleg , 
fishing mortality at a patch-specific rate Fi . The dynamics for the population abundance 
Xi,a,t  in the i-th patch at age a and time t (year) in each time step are then  
Xi,a,t+1 =
Xi,a−1,te−M ,             2 ≤ a < aleg
Xi,a−1,te−(Fi+M ),        aleg ≤ a ≤ amax,
#
$
%
&%
   (2) 
given maximum age amax .  
We convert age to size to both calculate population biomass as one of our output 
metrics and to calculate larval production in the population dynamics. We obtain the length 
at age La  using the von Bertalanffy growth equation, given the asymptotic length L∞ , the 
age at 0 cm a0 , and growth rate k: La = L∞ 1− e
−k a−a0( )( ) . We then obtain the biomass for 
each age Wa  using the allometlic relationship with constants b1  and b2 , Wa = b1La
b2 . 
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Total biomass in the system at time t, Bt , is the sum of the biomass over all age classes and 
patches, Bt = Wi, aXi, a, ta∑i∑ . For reproduction, we convert age to size to fecundity Ea , 
where sexually matured individuals (age a ≥ amat ) produce larvae after the fishing season. 
In cabezon, we use a fecundity-at-weight relationship to calculate Ea  (Table 1), and in 
abalone we use a fecundity-at-length relationship to calculate Ea  (Table A1). Total 
reproductive output is then Ri,t = EaXi, a, tamat
amax
∑ . 
We assume a sessile post-settlement stage where all connectivity between patches 
occurs through larval dispersal. To model this dispersal we introduce a discretized analogue 
of the Laplacian kernel, which represents the probability p(i, j)  that a larva is transported 
from i-th patch to j-th patch by ocean currents. Specifically, we start with an exponentially 
decreasing probability with distance from the larval origin p i, j( )∝ e− i− j m given integers i 
and j (Botsford et al., 2001; Kaplan, 2006; Lockwood et al., 2002), and choose the 
proportionality coefficient so as to satisfy p i, j( ) =1j=−∞
j=∞
∑ . The settlement probability is 
then:  
p i, j( ) = e1/m −1( ) / e1/m +1( ){ }e− i− j /m ,     (3) 
where m is a non-dimensional quantity that determines the migration ability of the species, 
such that the mean dispersal distance is m = 2e1/m / e1/m +1( ) e1/m −1( ) . All larvae that settle 
outside a habitat patch die, i.e., p(i,k) = 0 , for k outside the habitat. 
Density-dependent Beverton-Holt survivorship occurs among the total number of 
larvae (settlers) Si,t = Rj,t p(i, j)j∑  arriving at the i-th patch at the end of the fishing 
season in time t. Specifically, given the maximum settler survival rate α  and the carrying 
capacity in the i-th patch βi = ziK (where K is the baseline carrying capacity of one 
environmental patch with the value 104 ), the number of recruits (age class 1) at time t+1 
and location i is: 
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Xi,1,t+1 =
αSi,t
1+ (α / βi )Si,t
.     (4) 
 
Table 1 Cabezon (Scorpaenichthys marmorata) parameters, following the parameterization 
in White et al. (2010). 
Parameter Description Value Source* 
L∞  Maximum size 62.12 cm a 
k Growth rate 0.18 cm/year a 
a0  Age at 0 cm -1.06 year a 
b1  Coefficient in length-to-weight 
relationship 
9.2×10−6  a 
b2  Exponent in length-to-weight 
relationship 
3.187 a 
Ea  
Fecundity-at-weight (15.3Wa + 27.3)×103  
eggs 
b 
amax  
Maximum age 15 years a, c 
amat  
Age at maturity 3 years a 
acatch  
Age available to fishing 4 years  
(38.1cm) 
d 
M Natural mortality rate 0.25/year a 
m  Mean larvae dispersal distance  100 km c 
* a. Cope & Punt (2005); b. O’Connell (1953); c. White et al. (2010); d. CDFW (2014b) 
 
 
Fishery dynamics 
The manager’s allocation of fishing effort among the management patches 
depends on the single management scale and the goal of maximizing the equilibrium 
aggregate fishery profit Π2n
*  under the given fishing strategy (see below for two 
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strategies), where 2n  indicates the number of management patches. The aggregate fishery 
profit at time t, Π2n ,t  is the sum of the management patch-specific profits, π i,t  over all 
patches: 
Π2n ,t = π i,ti∑ .      (5) 
The patch-specific fishery profit π i,t  is the fishery revenue (product of the price P and 
biomass yield in the i-th patch at time t, Yi,t ) minus the harvest cost (product of per-patch 
cost of fishing mortality c and fishing effort in the i-th patch Fi ): 
π i,t = PYi,t − cFi .      (6) 
Given the biomass of legal-sized fish (a≥aleg) in the i-th patch at time t, 
Blegi,t = WaXi,a,tFialeg
amax
∑ , the yield in the i-th patch at time t, Yi,t , is 
Yi,t =
Blegi,t  Fi 1− e− Fi+M( )( )
Fi +M
     (7) 
(Rassweiler et al., 2012).  
We explore two optimal fishing strategies: (i) uniform effort strategy (UE 
strategy), and (ii) fine-tuned effort strategy (FE strategy). For the UE strategy, optimization 
occurs via allocation of fishing grounds (Ai=1 in management patch i) and zero effort or 
no-take reserve if the patch is habitat (Ai=0 to indicate a management patch with zero 
fishing effort) in each of the 2n management patches given a single fishing effort F on all 
open patches. Then the UE strategy achieves an optimization of aggregate fishery profit by 
choosing 2n +1  parameters A1,  A2,!,  A2n ,  F( )  together so as to maximize the objective 
function at equilibrium: 
max
A,F
Π2n
* =max
A,F
π i
*∑ ,      (8) 
where π i*  represents management patch-specific profit at equilibrium. For the FE strategy, 
optimization occurs via designating a different fishing mortality Fi in each of 2n  
management patch F1,  F2,!,  F2n( ) , where Fi =0 in management patches that include 
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habitat patch(es) represent cases where reserves are part of the management strategy. The 
objective function for the FE strategy is then 
max
F
π i
*∑ .       (9) 
Because it allows finer tuning of effort control, the FE strategy will inevitably outperform 
the UE strategy in terms of fishery profit, but it might be more costly to implement (see 
Discussion). Appendix S1 describes the two algorithms in more detail. 
Note that if fishing occurs in a non-habitat patch or unproductive habitat with a 
small carrying capacity, then it may result in a cost of cFi , or a negative profit in the patch 
on the environmental scale, but on the management scale all management patches satisfy 
π i,t ≥ 0 . While our investigation of management scale does not account for effort 
elimination within unprofitable environmental patches as a finer scale management does or 
as might occur through fisher behavior (e.g., fishers eventually noticing and avoiding 
non-habitat patches as they fish within a management unit), this is an effect that the 
manager tends to avoid non-productive habitats given a fixed management scale. Also, the 
negative profit may serve, in practice, as an approximated cost associated with 
coarse-filtered management (e.g., ineffective initial searching due to an unspecified/broad 
management unit scale). 
 
Model parameterization 
 We parameterize the model based on two example species in the California coast, 
cabezon (Scorpaenichthys marmorata) and red abalone (Haliotis rufescens), that have a 
relatively sedentary adult phase (adult home range <1km) and differ in their larval dispersal 
distance. These two species are economically important nearshore species and are expected 
to benefit from spatial fisheries management (CDFW 2014a). For simplicity we define P 
(price/kg) as 1 and c (cost/fishing effort) as a constant value (3000 in the main text; we 
investigate the parameter dependence in Appendix S2); our focus is on relative qualitative 
trends across varying management scales. We present results for cabezon in main text and 
for red abalone in Appendix S2 for demonstrating qualitatively robust results across these 
life histories (see Table 1 for cabezon and Appendix Table S1 for red abalone for the 
parameter values used in the analysis). 
 
Analysis 
We investigate the effect of the different management scales on the aggregate fishery profit, 
total population biomass, fishing mortality rate for the UE strategy and average fishing 
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mortality rate over non-reserve patches for the FE strategy, and the fraction of marine 
reserves, defined as [the number of habitat patches with no fishing mortality]/[the total 
number of habitat patches]. We consider a coastline containing 27  patches for the 
environmental scale. Therefore, the feasible set of management scales is 
27 km, 26 km,!, 20 km{ }  and the corresponding set of the number of management patches 
is 1,  2,!, 128{ } . We show the average value over 100 simulation trials, where the AR(1) 
model randomly generates a different landscape in each simulation run. In the simulations, 
we only consider the practically relevant cases where the fishery is profitable. 
 
Results 
 
Spatial fisheries management in positively autocorrelated landscapes 
 Because we do not account for a cost to subdivision, applying a finer 
management scale always increases the net benefit of fishing regardless of the fishing 
strategy (Fig. 2; note that we discuss the reason for this and other outcomes in the 
Discussion below). When the habitat landscape is positively autocorrelated (φ1 = 0.9  in Eq. 
1), the relative aggregate fishery profit increases with a finer management scale but with 
diminishing returns (Fig. 2a). The FE strategy always outperforms the UE strategy, but 
both show the same qualitative trend of diminishing returns with finer management scale. 
In addition, the effort distribution of the FE strategy is, by definition, more complex than 
that of the UE strategy (e.g., filed squares and solid line in Fig. 2e vs. 2d). 
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Figure 2 The effect of management scale on profit in an autocorrelated landscape 
(φ1 = 0.9 ). (a) Aggregate fishery profit, plotted relative to the profit given one management 
patch, as a function of management scale. Each line represents the fine-tuned effort strategy 
(FE strategy; squares, solid line) or the uniformed effort strategy (UE strategy; circles, 
dashed line). (b)-(e) Examples of fine-tuned effort (filed squares, solid line) for sample 
realizations of habitat landscape (squares, dashed line). Management scales and fishing 
strategies in each panel correspond to notations in the panel (a). 
 
 The total population biomass decreases as management scale becomes finer (Fig. 
3a), and the decline is more rapid under the FE strategy than the UE strategy. Initially, the 
reserve fraction increases rapidly, then it quickly saturates (Fig. 3b). The UE strategy 
always requires a larger reserve fraction than the FE strategy for optimal profit. Fishing 
mortality (Fig. 3c) increases with an increasing number of management patches at a 
decreasing rate. The UE strategy always requires higher fishing mortality rate than the FE 
strategy for optimizing profit. 
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Figure 3 The effect of management scale 
on biomass and management controls in an 
autocorrelated landscape ( φ1 = 0.9 ) with 
the FE strategy (squares, solid line) or the 
UE strategy (circles, dashed line). Each 
panel shows (a) biomass relative to its 
value given one management patch, (b) 
reserve fraction, defined as [the number of 
reserves]/[the number of habitats], and (c) 
fishing mortality rate for the UE strategy 
and average fishing mortality rate over 
non-reserve patches for the FE strategy. 
These results are the average value of the 
100 times simulation. 
 
 
Spatial fisheries management in uncorrelated landscapes 
 Without autocorrelation (φ1 = 0  in Eq. 1; white noise), fishery profit shifts to a 
near-linear function of management scale (Fig. 4a, FE strategy; the UE strategy shows an 
analogous qualitative trend). In other words, increasing the number of management patches 
no longer exhibits diminishing returns in fishery profit. Relative biomass initially increases 
with an increasing number of management patches when that number is small, but after that 
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it declines almost linearly as the number of management patches increases (Fig. 4b). 
Reserve fraction also peaks at an intermediate management scale, but at a greater number 
of patches than biomass (Fig. 4c). Fishing mortality initially decreases with an increasing 
number of management patches when that number is small, then subsequently increases 
almost linearly (Fig. 4d). 
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Figure 4 The effect of management scale in an uncorrelated landscape (φ1 = 0.0 ) under the 
FE strategy. Each panel shows (a) aggregate fishery profit, plotted relative to its value 
given one management patch, (b) biomass, plotted relative to its value given one 
management patch, (c) reserve fraction, and (d) average fishing mortality rate. These results 
are the average value of the 100 times simulation. 
 
Management efficacy and parameter sensitivity 
 Looking beyond aggregate fishery profit to a question of how fisheries can 
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effectively distribute fishing effort, the relative fraction of unprofitable patches declines 
with an increasing number of management patches (Fig. 5, FE strategy). This decline is 
more rapid for an autocorrelated landscape than an uncorrelated landscape, where the 
decline is nearly linear. 
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Figure 5 The number of unprofitable 
patches in the optimal effort allocation 
under the FE strategy. They are plotted 
relative to the number given one 
management patch, as a function of the 
environmental scale both in an 
autocorrelated landscape ( φ1 = 0.9 , box, 
thick line) and an uncorrelated landscape 
(φ1 = 0.0 , triangle, dashed line). 
 
 The qualitative trends described above are consistent for different values of 
settler survival, fishing effort cost, and natural mortality (Fig. S1) as well as for red abalone 
parameter values (Figs. S2, S3). 
We assumed the total patch number is 128 and show the average value of the 100 
simulation trials, and we verified that 100 trials were sufficient to capture the qualitative 
trends that drive our conclusions (Appendix S5; Fig. S5a). Note that, however, some effects 
of the stochasticity in habitat landscape generation remain, which arise from 
randomly-drawn habitat landscapes with either a large number or small number of habitat 
patches. Each trial shows quantitatively different results in the values of our output metrics, 
while the relative values across different management scales typically hold in each trial. 
The variability in the number of habitat patches of the landscape particularly affects the 
reserve fraction because the number of reserves primarily depend on the number of habitat 
patches in the landscape, which causes the within-trend fluctuations in Fig. 3b (see Fig. 
S5b). 
 
Discussion 
Assuming no cost to management subdivision, fishery profit increases with 
increasing management patches due to increased flexibility in spatial management. 
However, the shape of this relationship (which determines the potential for an intermediate 
peak in profit with management scale given cost to subdivision; discussed below) depends 
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critically on the degree of autocorrelation in the natural habitat. Specifically, profit saturates 
rapidly with the number of subdivisions with autocorrelation but increases in a near linear 
relationship without autocorrelation (Figs 2a, 4a). A landscape with positive autocorrelation 
is more clustered and hence contains larger-sized habitat patches. On the other hand, in 
uncorrelated landscapes individual habitat patches tend to be dispersed more evenly and 
averaged habitat size is smaller. Therefore, a finer filter is needed for spatial management 
in uncorrelated landscapes than autocorrelated landscape to achieve an effective allocation 
of fishing effort and marine reserves. In other words, if the same management scale is 
applied, managers inevitably place the fishing effort in a larger amount of unprofitable 
patches with uncorrelated landscapes than with autocorrelated landscapes (fig. 5). Given 
these contrasting relationships, the incremental improvement with increasing the number of 
subdivisions exhibits diminishing returns for autocorrelated habitats (fig. 2a) but is 
consistent across values for management scale in uncorrelated habitats (fig. 4a). 
Given the same degree of autocorrelation in landscapes, fisheries outcomes show 
qualitatively similar results between two different fishing strategies, the optimized effort 
allocation (FE) strategy and the uniform effort allocation (UE) strategy (Figs. 2 and 3) 
which indicates robustness of our results to different fishing approaches. However, in the 
FE strategy results in greater profit with lower fishing effort and lower population biomass 
and reserve fraction compared to the UE strategy: the FE strategy allows fishermen to 
increase fishery profit more effectively through the fine-tuned effort allocation and 
consequently it causes a larger decline in the biomass in comparison with the UE strategy. 
Regardless of the optimal zonal allocation of fishing effort, marine reserves are typically a 
part of optimal management, corresponding to previous models (Neubert 2003, Sanchirico 
et al. 2006), because the variability in habitat quality, in combination with dispersal, leads 
to patches where fishing is unprofitable (Fig. 5). 
 
The effect of management context 
We ignore any potential costs of finer management such as management costs 
and transaction costs (Naidoo et al. 2006) because of the uncertainty and variability of such 
costs. Whether increasing cost with management scale leads to a maximum net fishery 
benefit (aggregate fishery profit minus costs following subdivisions) at an intermediate 
management scale will depend on the shape of the cost function (e.g., linear, exponential, 
or saturating relationship) compared to the autocorrelation-driven shape of the profit curve. 
For example, under the simplest possible case of a linear increase in cost with management 
scale, the maximum net fishery benefit is more likely to occur at an intermediate 
management scale for fisheries in an autocorrelated landscape (Fig. S4a; with its saturating 
profit function vs. scale relationship) than an uncorrelated landscape (Fig. S4b; with its near 
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linear profit function vs. scale relationship, such that the resulting net benefit function will 
also be linear; see Appendix S3 for a detailed explanation). 
The cost of coarser scale management in our model arises from the potential to 
assign fishing effort to unprofitable environmental patches, including non-habitat patches. 
However, note that the profit in any management unit is always nonnegative (π i,t ≥ 0 ) 
under the optimal fishing strategies. Targeting of unprofitable locations may occur in 
reality due to ineffective initial searching by fishers for the harvested stock in a broader 
management region. Learning which regions are productive versus unproductive might be 
particularly slow, and therefore costly, if fishers do not share information (Allen, 2000) or 
population abundance varies in time.  
 In our model, this inefficiency is higher in the management with a coarser scale 
and it approaches to zero as the management scale becomes finer (Fig. 5). Explicitly 
incorporating the cost associated with the gap between ecological and management scales 
would require accounting for factors such as fisher behavior and institutional cooperation 
(Hilborn et al., 2005).  
Ownership among management patches is also an important factor determining 
the relationship between fishery profit and management scale. White and Costello (2011) 
investigated the effect of size of the management unit for territorial user rights fisheries 
(TURF, i.e., management unit) with a two-patch model consisting of homogeneous 
environment. They concluded that optimal harvesting with sustainable, maximized yield 
occurs if all fish stay within TURF boundaries, such that TURF owners fully "own" all fish 
within their respective territories.  This requires very small fish movement and/or very 
large TURF size, where any increase in fish mobility or decrease in TURF size that 
increases fish movement outside the TURF boundaries reduces ownership; if extreme, this 
reduced ownership can lead to overharvesting. Clearly, the difference the larger optimum 
management unit of White and Costello (2011) and our increasing profit with smaller 
management units is due to their incorporation of competition among fishermen, where 
assured ownership over the management unit determines the management success. In 
contrast, here we model the dynamics that would occur under federal level decision-making, 
cooperative management, or sole ownership, where competition among fishermen does not 
occur. 
Some fishery management regimes have a hierarchical allocation of fishing effort 
where each decision-making sector has different management scales. For example, in 
Japanese and Chilean TURF system, federal level regulations in each management unit 
could further be arranged among local fishermen by a finer management unit (Makino and 
Matsuda 2005, Cancino et al. 2007). In fact, Hilborn et al. (2005) noted that the hierachical 
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allocation of fishing effort caused serial depletion and collapse of California’s abalone 
fisheries. Namely, state-level regulations create highly heterogeneous fishing pressure in 
the fishing ground, generating a mixture of depleted local populations and lightly exploited 
populations (Richards and Davis 1993, Karpov et al. 2000). The optimal spatial scale of 
management under such hierarchical management regimes, a management approach in 
between our analysis and White and Costello (2011), will ultimately depend on the 
combination of incentives at both the individual and federal levels. Note that hierarchical 
scales could be incorporated into our model, such as by applying zero fishing effort to a 
large cluster of non-habitat patches but allocating effort more finely in other patches in the 
FE strategy. If we allow a management strategy to apply heterogeneous management unit 
scales, the additional dimension to optimize over would likely lead to faster initial increases 
in, and earlier diminishing returns for, aggregate fishery profit as a function of the number 
of subdivisions. 
Beyond reserves and harvested zones, small-scale spatial management has been 
increasingly relevant to marine systems (Shepherd 2003, Hilborn et al. 2005, Sanchirico 
and Wilen 2005). Marine population dynamics often occur on smaller spatial scales than 
the typical commercial fishery management scale of hundreds to thousands of kilometers 
inherent to regulatory institutions (Hilborn et al. 2005). A system of co-management, where 
the government and individual fishers both contribute to management decisions and 
implementation (Pomeroy and Williams. 1994, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), would lead a 
finer management scale that better matches the biologically relevant scale and therefore can 
increase fishery profit, as suggested by our results. For example, in the co-managed 
Japanese TURF system, local communities submit individual management plans to the 
Prefecture for regional-level coordination (Hilborn et al. 2005). 
Information availability can also affect optimal fisheries management and social 
decision-making (Andelman and Willig 2002, Richardson et al. 2006). We assumed 
implicitly perfect knowledge of managers in our model, as is often the case where 
managers intend to optimize the management outcomes based on metrics such as habitat 
quality (Neubert 2003, Sanchirico and Wilen 2005). Our model is most relevant to the 
situation where managers have a high degree of geographic and biological information. A 
high degree of information might be more common in systems of co-management, where 
fishermen typically collect finer-scale fisheries information because of the local-level 
management (Pomeroy and Berkes 1997), than the case of stock-level management 
modeled here. For example, in the case of fishing cooperative associations (FCA) in Japan 
(i.e., a co-management fishery), local, regional, and national governmental coordination in 
the design and implementation of fishery regulations (Lim et al. 1995) may allow a 
stock-level management institution to acquire fine resolution geographic and biological 
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information. Technological innovations in marine spatial management can also facilitate 
collection of fine resolution data by a stock-level management institution. For example, 
remote sensing can map important ocean processes that influence species distributions, and 
geographic information systems (GIS) technology can help identify locations with essential 
habitat (Valavanis et al. 2004, 2008). More typically, given imperfect knowledge of 
demographic and biological parameters, our model might overestimate fishery profits, 
especially when managers apply a fine management scale, because of uncertainties in 
choosing appropriate patches. In this case, another trade-off, between flexible management 
and optimization errors, might arise. 
 
Conservation vs. fishery management goals 
Our analysis shows the significance of the choice of management scale in spatial 
fishery management: applying a different spatial scale of management alters the outcome 
for both in economic and ecological metrics, such as fishery profit, reserve fraction, fishing 
mortality rate, and population biomass. Specifically, a finer management scale allows 
fishermen to increase fishery profit effectively, but it causes a larger decline in biomass 
because of the more fine-tuned fishing (Figs. 3, 4), showing a tradeoff between economic 
values versus conservation value in spatial planning (also observed in White et al. 2012; 
Rassweiler et al. 2014). Hence, a careful consideration of both management goals and 
management scale is crucial for management success. 
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Appendix S1: Optimization of the aggregate fishery profit 
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Here we describe the heuristic algorisms used to obtain local maximum fishery 
profit in each landscape for a given management scale. 
 
(i) Uniformed effort strategy 
The uniformed effort strategy (UE strategy) achieves an optimization of aggregate 
fishery profit by choosing 2n +1  parameters together so as to maximize the objective 
function at equilibrium Π2n* = π i*∑ , where 2n  is the number of management patches and 
i represents the environmental patch. First, 2n  binary parameters A1,  A2,!,  A2n( )  
represent a reserve or fishing ground in each management patch, and the additional 
parameter F represents the intensity of the fishing effort applied to all fishing grounds. For 
each value of intensity of fishing effort F, we calculate an optimal set of reserves and 
fishing grounds allocation A1,  A2,!,  A2n( ) , and finally we select the set of 
A1,  A2,!,  A2n ,  F( )  that shows the highest equilibrium aggregate fishery profit. We start 
with F = 0.1  and increase F by an increment of 0.1 unless optimized fisheries profit goes 
to 0. We attain an optimal allocation of reserves and fishing grounds A1,  A2,!,  A2n( )  by 
applying the greedy algorithm, a procedure in which we start with each management patch 
designated randomly as either a reserve or fishing ground and then search across all of the 
management patches from the first management patch until we find a case in which 
switching a patch’s designation increases the aggregate profit. After making this switch, we 
repeat the same procedure from the first management patch until we find an allocation of 
fishing grounds and reserves where no switch increases the aggregate fishery profit, 
following Rassweiler et al. (2012). We maintain Π2n+1* ≥ Π2n*  by imposing multiple 
simulation runs if the condition is not satisfied. Comparison with other heuristic algorithms 
is discussed in more detail in Rassweiler et al. (2012). 
 
(ii) Fine-tuned effort strategy 
By natural extension of the conditional-multiple-start greedy algorithm discussed 
above, we attain an optimization of the aggregate fishery profit under fine-tuned effort 
strategy (FE strategy) by choosing 2n  parameters F1,  F2,!,  F2n( ) , where 2n  is the 
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number of management patches and Fi  represents fishing effort in management patch i. 
To find the optimal values of F1,  F2,!,  F2n( ) , we apply an analogue of the greedy 
algorithm and a local search algorithm with, if necessary, multiple trials with different 
initial conditions. We start with each management patch having a fishing effort level 
assigned from an independent and identically distributed random variable with range 
Fi ∈ 0,1[ ]  with 0.1 step size, and we impose an amount and/or decrement of the intensity 
of fishing effort by an increment of 0.1 upon the first management patch and search across 
all of the management patches until we find a case in which an increment and/or decrement 
of the intensity of fishing increases the aggregate profit. Then we make the switch and 
repeat the same procedure from the first management patch until finding final allocation of 
fishing effort F1,  F2,!,  F2n( )  where no switch improves the aggregate profit. In addition 
to the condition Π2n+1* ≥ Π2n* , we maintain Π2n*  of the FE strategy ≥ Π2n* of the UE 
strategy by imposing multiple simulation runs if these conditions are not satisfied. 
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Parameter Description Value Source* 
L∞  Maximum size 19.24 cm a 
k Growth rate 0.2174 cm/year a 
a0  
Age at 0 cm 0 year a 
b1  Coefficient in length-to-weight 
relationship 
1.69×10−4  b 
b2  Exponent in length-to-weight 
relationship 
3.02 b 
Ea  
Fecundity-at-length 15.32La4.518  eggs 
c 
amax  
Maximum age 30 years d 
amat  
Age at maturity 3 years e 
acatch  
Age available to fishing 8 years (17.8 cm) f 
M Natural mortality rate 0.15/year g 
m  Mean larvae dispersal distance 5 km f, h 
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Appendix S2: Sensitivity analysis 
 Here we show the results of a sensitivity analysis focused on the parameters with 
the greatest expected uncertainty (Fig. S1) and the results for the second species tested, 
namely Red Abalone (Haliotis rufescens; Figs. S2 and S3). The qualitative trends 
highlighted in the main text, such as the diminishing returns in aggregate fishery profit with 
finer management scale given habitat autocorrelation, are consistent across species and 
parameter values. 
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Figure S1 Dependence of the 
relative aggregate fishery profit in 
an autocorrelated landscape 
(φ1 = 0.9 ) under the FE strategy, 
plotted relative to its value given 
one management patch, on (a) 
maximum settler survival rate α, 
(b) cost of fishing effort c, and (c) 
natural mortality M. Red lines 
represents the value used in the 
main text. 
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Figure S2 The effect of management scale on red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) in an 
autocorrelated landscape under the FE strategy (squares, solid line) or the UE strategy 
(circles, dashed lines). Each panel shows (a) aggregate fishery profit, plotted relative to its 
value given one management patch, (b) biomass, plotted relative to its value given one 
management patch, (c) reserve fraction, and (d) average fishing mortality rate. 
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Figure S3 The effect of management scale on red abalone (Haliotis rufescens) in an 
uncorrelated landscape under FE strategy. Each panel shows (a) aggregate fishery profit, 
plotted relative to its value given one management patch, (b) biomass, plotted relative to its 
value given one management patch, (c) reserve fraction, and (d) average fishing mortality 
rate. 
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Appendix S3: Derivation of cost 
As an example for how we might account for costs, let us assume that the cost of 
management increases with the number of management patches and is static over time. We 
may obtain a functional form α1Nα2  as an additional cost of spatial fishery management, 
where N is the number of management patches (1≤ N ≤128 ; see the main text) and both 
α1  and α2  are > 0. By subtracting this additional cost from Eq. 4 at equilibrium, we 
arrive at a net fishery benefit at equilibrium of Πˆ*2n = π *i∑ −α12nα2 , where 2n  is a feasible 
number of management patches. Fig. S4 conceptually illustrates the net fishery benefit in 
the case where α2 =1, i.e., assuming that the aggregated fishery profit is a liner function of 
the number of management patches N in an uncorrelated landscape. In an autocorrelated 
landscape, if a cost of management α12nα2  exceeds an aggregate fishery profit π *i∑  in 
0 < n ≤ 7 , the curve of the net fishery benefit Πˆ*2n  is likely to have an intermediate 
optimum in the management scale that maximizes the net fishery benefit, Πˆ*2n (Fig. S4a). 
Alternatively, in an uncorrelated landscape, the net fishery benefit does not have an 
intermediate optimum (Fig. S4b). More generally (i.e., for all α2 > 0 ), in an uncorrelated 
landscape where the aggregated fishery profit is an approximately liner function of the 
number of management patches N, we can describe the aggregated profit with slope A1  
and intercept A2 : A1N + A2 . As defined above, the net fishery benefit is the aggregate 
fishery benefit minus the additional cost: Πˆ*N = A1N + A2 −α1Nα2 . The second derivative of 
the net fishery benefit is then dΠˆ*N dN 2 = −α1α2 α2 −1( )Nα2−2 > 0 for 0 <α2 <1 , and 
therefore is a convex function (Boccara 1990), implying that there is no intermediate 
optimum. In fact, the net fishery benefit can have a global maximum for α2 >1  because of 
the concavity as the above condition suggests, but not for N ≥1  where our analysis is 
focused. We can briefly explain this fact: In the domain N ≥1  and for α2 >1 , the 
additional cost is the lowest at N =1 and increases monotonically with N, and the net benefit 
function Πˆ*N , which is a linearly increasing function minus a monotonically and 
exponentially increasing function, is a monotonically decreasing function in N ≥1 , 
implying that it does not have an intermediate optimum.  Therefore, an intermediate 
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optimum in management scale given any cost to subdivision is unlikely to occur in an 
uncorrelated landscape but is likely to occur in an autocorrelated landscape. 
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Figure S4 Conceptual diagram of the net fishery benefit, which is the aggregate fishery 
profit (dashed red lines) minus an additional cost (dashed blue lines). For illustration, we 
assume that the cost of subdivision (dashed blue lines) increases linearly with an increasing 
number of management patches (e.g., as might occur due to increasing enforcement costs). 
(a) The net fishery benefit (solid black line) in an autocorrelated landscape has an 
intermediate optimum given the saturating profit function (dashed red line). (b) The net 
fishery benefit in an uncorrelated landscape does not have an intermediate optimum 
because the net benefit decreases monotonically with the number of management patches 
(solid black line). 
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Appendix S4: Validity of the simulation settings 
Here we verify that the number of trials used in our simulations is sufficient to capture 
qualitative trends. The qualitative relationship between aggregate fishery profit and the 
number of management patches is consistent regardless of the number of simulation trials 
used (25-150 trials), and the simulations converge in the range of the 100-trial results (Fig. 
S5a).  The rapidly saturating relationship between reserve fraction and the number of 
management patches is consistent across realizations, while the variability within that 
relationship represents the stochastic effects of habitat patch selection (Fig. S5b; see 
Results: Management efficacy and parameter sensitivity). 
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Figure S5 Verification that 100 simulation trials captures qualitative trends for the 
fine-tuned effort strategy. (a) Aggregate fishery profit in an autocorrelated landscape 
(φ1 = 0.9 ) with various numbers of simulation trials. Each line, plotted relative to the value 
given one management patch, shows the average value of simulation trials: 25 (cross), 50 
(star), 75 (circle), 100 (box), and 150 (triangle). (b) Realizations of reserve fractions of the 
five different hundred-time simulation trials. 
 
